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No Do-Overs for Parties Who Agree to
Limit Review of an Arbitrator's
Decision
MACTEC, Inc. v. Gorelick'
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is a process used to settle controversies.2 More specifically, arbi-
tration is a private dispute resolution process based on a contractual relationship in
which the parties agree to use a neutral decision maker to resolve issues arising
under the contract. An arbitrator renders a decision based on the evidence pre-
sented by the parties in a manner similar to a judicial process; however, arbitration
is much less formal.3 The benefits of utilizing arbitration are that it saves money
and often produces a result more quickly than judicial adjudication. 4 Many stat-
utes and extensive case law purport to govern the arbitration process, but the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act (FAA) sets out the default rules that govern all arbitrations.5
Under the FAA, review of arbitration awards is limited to specific circum-
stances. 6 However, in many instances, these default rules can be modified by
contractual provisions including increasing or decreasing the level of review of
arbitration awards. Although a broader scope of review is contrary to the main
purposes of arbitration, courts have held that a contractual provision expanding
judicial review is permissible. 8  Furthermore, in some limited circumstances,
courts have held that a contractual limitation on judicial review is permitted by the
FAA where the restriction is clearly manifested in the contract and the process
will not become unfair as a result of the limitation. 9
1. 427 F.3d 821 (10th Cir. 2005).
2. Allen Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TaX. INT'L
L.J. 449, 469 (2005).
3. See David L. Erickson & Peter Geoffrey Bowen, Two Alternatives to Litigation: An Introduc-
tion to Arbitration and Mediation, 60-Jan. DISP. RESOL. J. 42,43-44 (2006).
4. See id. at 48; Jennifer Trieshmann, Note, Horizontal Uniformity and Vertical Chaos: State
Choice of Law Clauses and Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 161.
5. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006).
6. See id. § 16.
7. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around RUAA: Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and
Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 3 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. 419 (2003); Seth Mosebey, The Fifth
Circuit Reaffirms Ability of Parties to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review in Arbitration Agreements
in Prescott v. Northlake Christian School, 3 J. Am. Arb. 275, 281-82 (2004); Allen Scott Rau, Con-
tracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 Am. REV. INT'L ARB. 225, 231-32 (1997).
8. See Prescott v. Northlake Christian School, 369 F.3d 491,498 (5th Cir. 2004).
9. See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 931 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting in dicta that
"parties to an arbitration agreement may eliminate judicial review by contract"); Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v.
Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir.1973) (same).
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II. FACTS & HOLDING
Plaintiff-Appellant MACTEC, Inc. (MACTEC) and Defendant-Appellee Ste-
ven Gorelick (Gorelick) entered into a written agreement renegotiating the royalty
payments made from MACTEC to Gorelick for MACTEC's use of a groundwater
decontamination method developed by Gorelick.1° Gorelick and Haim Gvritzman
(Gvritzman), both professors at Stanford University, "developed a new method for
removing volatile organic contaminants from groundwater (the NoVOCs technol-
ogy)."'" Gorelick and Gvritzman then assigned all of their interest in the No-
VOCs technology to Stanford University and, in return, Stanford agreed to assign
a one-sixth share of the royalties to both Gorelick and Gvritzman. 12 Stanford
applied for and received a patent for the NoVOCs technology.
13
Subsequently, in 1992, Gorelick formed a company, NoVOCs, Inc., which
utilized this new technology. 14 Stanford granted Gorelick an exclusive license for
the use of the NoVOCs technology and, in return, Gorelick agreed to pay annual
royalties to Stanford. 15 Two years later, in 1994, Gorelick sold all of his interest
in NoVOCs, Inc., along with the exclusive license, from Stanford to EG & G in a
stock purchase agreement (the Agreement). 16 Under the Agreement, EG & G paid
Gorelick $3.3 million up-front and further agreed to make installment payments to
Gorelick based on revenue derived from licenses or sub-licenses of the NoVOCs
technology as well as payments of "$3000 for each well EG & G drilled using the
NoVOCs technology."'
17
Under the Agreement, the parties would go to arbitration under California law
for all disputes concerning the agreement.' 8 Further, the Agreement provided that
any judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrator would be final and non-
appealable and excluded claims of patent infringement or invalidity from the
scope of arbitrable issues:
Two aspects of the stock purchase agreement are particularly relevant to
this appeal: First, the agreement specifically excluded from the scope of
arbitrable issues any disputes relating to patent invalidity or infringe-
ment. Second, the agreement provided that any judgment upon the award
rendered by the arbitrator would be final and nonappealable.'
9
10. MACTEC, Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821, 823-25 (10th Cir. 2005). This new technology was
novel because it allowed decontamination of water in situ, while still in the ground, using gas stripping
and vapor stripping processes. Id. at 824.




15. Id. Gorelick was the sole owner of NoVOCs and he held all interest in the exclusive license




19. Id. The non-appealability clause states that "[j]udgment upon the award rendered by the arbitra-
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The clause, therefore, stipulated that the arbitrator's ruling could not be chal-
lenged by either party once a court with jurisdiction entered a judgment based on
the arbitrator's ruling. As a result of the Agreement, EG & G held the exclusive
license from Stanford to use the patented NoVOCs technology and assumed the
duty to make royalty payments to Stanford as required by the Agreement between
Stanford and Gorelick.2 °
In 1997, MACTEC purchased assets from EG & G.21 The asset purchase in-
cluded all of EG & G's interest and stock in NoVOCs, Inc., including the exclu-
sive license from Stanford for use of their patented NoVOCs technology.2 2 Fur-
ther, MACTEC assumed "all of EG & G's payment obligations to Stanford and
Gorelick.
23
In 1998, through one if its LLC subsidiaries, MACTEC began using another
technology-UBV, or IEG, technology-which supplanted the NoVOCs technol-
ogy, to treat groundwater. 24 As a result, MACTEC had difficulty determining its
royalty obligation to Gorelick, and asked Gorelick to renegotiate the royalty pay-
ments. 25 The parties signed a written agreement (the 1998 Agreement) that re-
duced royalty payments to $1,500 for "remediation wells" installed by
MACTEC's subsidiary.
26
Under the 1998 Agreement, a remediation well included any well that was in-
stalled by MACTEC's LLC subsidiary. 27 The classification of a well as a "reme-
diation well" was conditioned on the well being created by MACTEC's LLC sub-
sidiary, and the type of technology used to treat the water was not a factor in the
classification. 28  Further, the agreement provided that MACTEC would pay
$3,000 to Gorelick for any MACTEC well not made by MACTEC's LLC subsidi-
ary, and therefore not a "remediation well," regardless of the technology used with
a specific well.29 The well classification and payment requirements did not de-
pend on whether the NoVOCs technology or the UBV/IEG technology was
used.30 Gorelick received payments from MACTEC under the 1998 Agreement
for two years.
3 1
Subsequent to Gorelick receiving his last payment from MACTEC, he
learned that MACTEC had terminated its licensing agreement with Stanford.32
Subsequently, Gorelick contacted MACTEC regarding its missed payments, and
MACTEC claimed that no royalty obligations to Gorelick remained because of its
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 825.
23. Id. at 824-25.
24. Id. at 825.
25. Id. MACTEC did not know if the use of the new technology would trigger an obligation to pay
Gorelick $3000 for the well. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The definition, in the new agreement, of a remediation well was stated as "any hole that (i)
has been dug, drilled, or otherwise installed, or (ii) which existed and has been converted in use, and
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termination of the licensing agreement with Stanford.33 However, Gorelick
claimed that his separate agreement with MACTEC created a legal obligation that
MACTEC must honor.34 Also, Gorelick believed MACTEC had inadequately
accounted for all the wells that would trigger payment and requested specific in-
formation from MACTEC regarding the remediation wells.35 MACTEC did not
provide any information to clarify the dispute.
36
In August 2001, Gorelick filed a demand seeking arbitration to recover roy-
alty payments due under the stock purchase agreement.37 Through discovery,
Gorelick learned that MACTEC had failed to pay royalties on several newly
drilled wells, and this issue became the main focus of the dispute.38 MACTEC
claimed that the wells in question were drilled using public-domain technology
and therefore it was not obligated to pay royalties to Gorelick.39 In response,
Gorelick cited the 1998 Agreement, which required payment for all wells used by
MACTEC and did not differentiate between the technologies used for a specific
well.n0
During the arbitration, MACTEC sought introduction of extrinsic evidence to
establish that the parties to the agreement intended a different definition of a
"remediation well.",41 The arbitrator excluded the extrinsic evidence because he
found no ambiguity in the terms of the agreement.42 In its hearing brief filed only
days before the hearing, MACTEC raised two affirmative defenses claiming that
Gorelick's contract interpretation constituted patent misuse and that Gorelick's
patent was invalid.43 Gorelick moved to strike the affirmative defenses because
they were not timely "(pursuant to the arbitrator's scheduling order).' The arbi-
trator granted the motion.45 After the four-day arbitration, the arbitrator found for
Gorelick and awarded him nearly $4.5 million in damages. 46
MACTEC challenged the decision by filing an application to vacate the arbi-
trator's award pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)47 in
federal district court.48 Three arguments were raised by MACTEC in support of
their challenge: "(1) it was improper for the arbitrator to exclude extrinsic evi-




36. Id. MACTEC, however, did claim that NoVOCs technology had cost their company $3 million





41. Id. at 826. The "MACTEC definition" of remediation wells would support their position that the
agreement only required royalty payments for wells utilizing the NoVOCs technology. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. MACTEC's claim of patent invalidity was based on a ruling by the European Patent Office
concluding "that the technology was not based on an 'inventive step.' " Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. The arbitrator struck the defenses for three reasons: (1) the defenses were not received in
writing by the required date; (2) after extensive discovery and motions, new defenses can't be raised
within a week of the arbitration; and (3) lack of jurisdiction to decide patent issues. Id.
46. Id.
47. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002).
48. MACTEC, 427 F.3d at 826. The stock purchase agreement provided for such review. Id.
[Vol. 2006
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patent misuse defense; and (3) enforcement of the award would be patent misuse
and would therefore be illegal., 49  The federal district court, in ruling against
MACTEC, held that the arbitrator did not violate section 10 by either striking the
defense of patent misuse or by excluding extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent.
50
Further, the court held that enforcing the arbitrator's award was not patent misuse
and did not violate public policy.
51
Two weeks after instituting its action to vacate the arbitrator's award,
MACTEC filed another complaint in the same federal district court seeking a
declaratory judgment of patent misuse based on the interpretation of the contract
by Gorelick and the arbitrator. 52 Gorelick moved to dismiss the complaint be-
cause MACTEC failed to state a claim, and because the action was barred by res
judicata.53 The same court dismissed with prejudice MACTEC's petition seeking
a declaration of patent misuse, which was one day after the denial of MACTEC's
vacatur application. 54 MACTEC then appealed both district court decisions and
Gorelick filed a motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction.55 In dismiss-
ing the arbitration appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirming the district court's
dismissal of the declaratory judgment action, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that clear and unequivocal contract language rendering the district court's
judgment "final" and "nonappealable" was permissible.56
IR. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Federal Jurisdiction for Reviewing Arbitration Awards
The review of an arbitration award is "grudgingly narrow. '57 A district court
58
reviewing an arbitration award is prohibited from using independent judgment.
49. Id.
50. Id.
[T]he district court held that: (1) the arbitrator did not violate 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) by either (a)
granting the motion to strike the defense of patent misuse, or (b) refusing to hear evidence of the




52. Id. at 827.
53. Id. Gorelick's motion for dismissal was based on FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6). Id.
54. Id. The court based its ruling on its earlier order denying MACTEC's application to vacate and
the reasons set forth then. Id.
55. Id. A portion of the arbitration agreement indicated that a district court ruling on an arbitration
award would be "final." Id. at 828.
56. Id. at 830, 832-33.
57. Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1994); Morrison v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 662 (3d Cir. 2003); Bargenquast v. Nakano Foods, Inc., 243 F. Supp.
2d 772, 776 (N.D. 111. 2002); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REv. 931, 954 (1999); Sara Lingafelter, Comment, Lack
of Meaningful Choice Defined: Your Job vs. Your Right to Sue in a Judicial Forum, 28 SEATrLE U. L.
REV. 803, 810 (2005).
58. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 2001); Ormsbee Dev. Co. v. Grace,
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Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), federal district courts may vacate an
arbitration award on four grounds:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in re-
fusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refus-
ing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced;
or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly exe-
cuted them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject mat-
ter submitted was not made.
59
In Wilko v. Swan,60 the Supreme Court held that an arbitration award also
may be vacated if the arbitrator acted with a "manifest disregard" for the law.
61
However, generally, an arbitrator's misinterpretation of law or findings of fact
will not warrant reversal.62 Further, reversal is not appropriate even if the arbitra-
tor's decision is not supported by sufficient evidence. 63 Additionally, the FAA
provides, to the extent that justice requires, for modification of an arbitration
award upon the motion of any party to the arbitration in three situations:
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an
evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or prop-
erty referred to in the award; (b) Where the arbitrators have awarded
upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting
the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted; (c) Where the
award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the con-
troversy.
64
Such limited review furthers the benefits of arbitration: a private system of
justice; reduced cost and delay; and the prevention of arbitration from becoming a
"preliminary step to judicial resolution., 65
59. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2002).
60. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by, Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989). The "Manifest Disregard" for the law standard
is still used by courts to determine when judicial intervention is appropriate. Solvay Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Duramed Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 442 F.3d 471,476 (6th Cir. 2006).
61. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37.
62. GMS Group, LLC v. Benderson, 326 F.3d 75, 77-87 (2nd Cir. 2003); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v.
Matrix Commc'ns Corp., 135 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 1998); Elier Mfg., 14 F.3d at 1254; Nat'l Wrecking
Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 731, 990 F.2d 957 (7th Cir.1993); Moseley, Hallgarten, Es-
tabrook, & Weeden v. Ellis, 849 F.2d 264 (7th Cir.1988); James Richardson & Sons v. W.E. Hedger
Transp. Corp., 98 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 657.
63. Supra note 62; Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431-32; UCO Terminals, Inc. v. Apex Oil Co., 583 F.Supp.
1213 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), affd, 751 F.2d 371.
64. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1947).
65. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431-32; Eljer Mfg., 14 F.3d at 1254 (quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours v.
Grasselli Empoyees Indep. Ass'n., 790 F.2d 611, 614 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986));
Island Creek Coal Sales Co. v. City of Gainesville, Fla., 764 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
[Vol. 2006
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Review by the court of appeals of a district court's decision concerning a mo-
tion to vacate an arbitration award is limited in that factual findings are examined
only for clear errors.66 However, questions of law are reviewed de novo by the
court of appeals.
67
The United States Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear appeals "from all
final decisions of the district court of the United States ... except where a direct
review may be had by the Supreme Court., 68  The term "final decision" has a
well-established definition that has been applied consistently throughout the fed-
eral courts as a decision that "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing
more for the court to do but execute the judgment. ' '69 A final decision may also
include a "narrow class of decisions that do not terminate the litigation," but must
be deemed "final" in order to further the pursuit of justice.70 Further, the FAA
authorizes appeals from a court order "confirming or denying confirmation of an
award or partial award," or "modifying, correcting, or vacating an award," or "a
final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title. 71
B. Arbitration Clauses Limiting Review
It is clear that judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely limited, and
under the FAA, review is very deferential, creating one of the narrowest reviews
in all areas of law.72 However, while the FAA does indicate when vacatur of an
arbitration award is appropriate and provides that such decisions may be appealed
to the district court, it does not address whether appeal of arbitration awards may
be barred by agreement of the parties.73
Several courts have enforced agreements between parties to arbitrate that alter
the judicial review of arbitration awards. 74 However, the majority of these agree-
ments increased, rather than decreased, the level of judicial review available under
U.S. 948; Diapulse Corp. of America v. Carba, Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108, 1110 (2d Cir. 1980); Office of
Supply v. New York Navigation Co., 469 F.2d 377, 379 (2d Cir. 1972).
66. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 931 (10th Cir. 2001).
67. Id.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
69. Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 204 (1999); Digital Equipment Corp. v.
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233
(1945)); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86-87 (2000); FirsTier Mortgage Co. v.
Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 273 (1991); Stubblefield v. Windsor Capital Group, 74
F.3d 990, 995-96 (10th Cir. 1996); In re Magic Circle Energy Corp., 889 F.2d 950, 953 (10th Cir.
1989).
70. Id.
71. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1990).
72. Id.
73. §§ 10(a), 16.
74. Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2003); see, e.g., Roadway Package Sys., Inc.
v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir.2001) (cases increasing the level of judicial review available
under the FAA); LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 888-89 (9th Cir.1997) (same)
(overruled by Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir.
2003) (en banc); Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir.1995)
(same); see also Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 931 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting in dicta
that "parties to an arbitration agreement may eliminate judicial review by contract"); Aerojet-Gen.
Corp. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir.1973) (same).
No. 2]
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the FAA.75 There have been relatively few court decisions addressing the en-
forceability of agreements reducing judicial review of arbitration awards.76
Certainly, there is a "fundamental difference" between an agreement to in-
crease and an agreement to decrease the judicial review of an arbitration award.77
In enacting the FAA, Congress sought to balance the importance of a flexible
dispute resolution system with the need to prevent patently unfair arbitration
awards by delineating specific safeguards in section 10(a).78 Therefore, the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc.,79 held that parties
cannot require a federal court to approve flawed awards by removing the federal
court's ability to review the compliance of an arbitration award with section 10(a)
of the FAA. 80 Further, the court held that, while arbitration is a contractual crea-
tion, the judicial review of an arbitration award is not contractual in nature and
cannot be deprived by a private agreement.81 Specifically, the Second Circuit held
that a party seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement in federal court may not
eliminate the statutory and common law right of the federal court to review arbi-
tration awards and process under section 10(a) of the FAA. 2
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., also
addressed the issue of a private agreement limiting the judicial review of an arbi-
tration award.84 The court noted that section 9 of the FAA requires either express
or implied intent from the arbitration parties to allow a court to enter a judgment
on the arbitrator's awards.8 5 In that case, the district court confirmed the arbitra-
tion award; Amoco appealed the decision and sought vacatur of the arbitration
award. 86 Subsequently, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of ju-
risdiction based on the arbitration agreement language, which stated that a district
court's ruling "shall be final."87 The court ruled that the arbitration agreement
was only a finality clause which permitted the district court to enter a judgment on
88an arbitration award. Further, the court noted that an arbitration agreement may
limit the judicial review of an arbitration award only if the parties clearly and
unequivocally express their intention to further limit judicial review.89






81. Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 2003).
82. Id. However, the court did not address the issue of limiting appellate review.
83. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925,931 (10th Cir. 2001).




88. Id. at 931.
89. Id.; see also U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 149 F.3d 1184 (6th Cir. 1998)
(appellate review not limited by language in arbitration agreement that did not expressly limit review).
[Vol. 2006
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In MACTEC, Inc. v. Gorelick,9° the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had to de-
cide whether an arbitration agreement, which stated that a judgment entered on the
arbitrator's award "shall be final and nonappealable," eliminated appellate juris-
diction and prevented the instant court from deciding an appeal of the arbitration
award.91 In ruling that the Tenth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to hear a challenge to
the arbitrator's award, the Tenth Circuit held that parties to an arbitration can limit
judicial review if the limitation is expressly stated in the arbitration agreement and
the intent of the parties to limit review is clear and unequivocal.92
The court, in reaching this decision, first addressed the Tenth Circuit opinion
expressed in Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co.,93 which held that "parties may not
contract for expanded judicial review of arbitration awards." 94 In the instant deci-
sion, the court refused to follow the presumption that if judicial review could not
be expanded by agreement of the parties to an arbitration, then review could also
not be constricted. 95 Also, the present court cited the dicta in the Bowen opinion,
which stated that judicial review may be eliminated by parties to an arbitration if
the provision is clearly and unequivocally stated in the arbitration agreement.
96
This difference in handling contractual provisions to contract and expand judicial
review of arbitration decisions was justified by the court in that this duality, while
contradictory, does further the fundamental policies behind the FAA of reducing
litigation costs and providing efficient dispute resolution forums.
97
Next, the court focused on the extent to which private restrictions on judicial
review of arbitration awards should be upheld.98 Following the Second Circuit
opinion expressed in Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc. ,99 the court noted that an arbitra-
tion agreement cannot prohibit federal courts from applying the standards in sec-
tion 10(a) of the FAA. 1° In distinguishing the present case from Hoeft, the court
noted a significant difference in that the nonappealability clause in Hoeft applied
to the district court, while the clause at issue here only eliminates review by the
appellate court. 10 1 Further, the court noted that the present clause preserved re-
view by the district court, and that each party bore the risk of living with the deci-
90. 427 F.3d 821 (10th Cir. 2005).
91. Id. at 827.
92. Id. at 830.
93. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 931.
94. Id. at 937.




99. Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2003).
100. MACTEC, 427 F.3d at 829. The FAA standards for allowing vacatur of an arbitration award are:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was
evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in re-
fusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2002).
101. MACTEC, 427 F.3d at 829.
No. 21
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sion of the district court. 102 In support of its decision, the court also noted that the
present situation is simply a compromise where the parties have traded the risk of
lengthy appellate review for a single review by the district court, and it is common
for courts to enforce such agreements waiving appellate review of district court
decisions. 103 In conclusion, the Tenth Circuit held that a contractual provision
eliminating the right to appeal from a district court judgment concerning an arbi-
tration award is valid as long as the provision is clear and unequivocal.
10 4
V. COMMENT
From a careful analysis of the extensive scope of the FAA, one could easily
surmise that the rules governing arbitration are fixed and unchangeable. Yet, in
most instances, the terms of a contractual agreement between two parties submit-
ting a dispute to arbitration control over the default rules set forth in the FAA.105
This is because the purpose of the FAA was to provide recognition of the validity
of arbitrations and require the courts to enforce such agreements as any other con-
tract would be enforced, 1° 6 and to allow the parties' chosen contract terms to gov-
ern the arbitration with the FAA applying only when a gap in the agreement needs
to be filled. 0 7
Some of the benefits of arbitration are that it should be quicker and less ex-
pensive than alternate adjudicative processes, and it is a more relaxed process than
formal adjudication. 08 Another key aspect of arbitration is that it "preclude[s]
judicial intervention into the merits of a dispute."'1 9 This important feature of
arbitration is reflected in the limited scope of review that is permitted by the
FAA." 0 In looking at the purpose of the FAA, which is to further the use of arbi-
tration and enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, it makes sense
that further limitations on judicial review are consistent with the FAA because the
"default" FAA rules themselves limit the scope of review available to arbitration
parties."' Limited review is an essential element of arbitration in that it furthers
the advantages of increased efficiency and reduced costs that set arbitration apart
102. Id. at 829-30.
103. Id. at 830.
104. Id.
105. Milana Koptsiovsky, Comment, A Right to Contract for Judicial Review of an Arbitration
Award: Does Freedom of Contract Apply to Arbitration Agreements?, 36 CoNN. L. REV. 609, 615
(2004) ("[Ihe FAA appears to have been intended as a tool to ensure enforcement of a private con-
tract on its own terms."); see Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 478 (1989). The FAA "simply requires courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to
arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms." Id. (emphasis added).
106. Volt, 489 U.S. 468 at 474-75.
107. Drahozal, supra note 7, at 420; Koptsiovsky, supra note 105, at 627-28; see Gateway Technolo-
gies, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995).
108. Erickson & Bowen, supra note 3, at 43-44; William C. Hermann, Note, Arbitration of Securities
Disputes: Rodriguez and New Arbitration Rules Leave Investors Holding a Mixed Bag, 65 IND. L.J.
697, 721 (1990).
109. John T. Tutterow, Comment, The Constitution v. Arbitration: Rollings v. Thermodyne and a
Proposal for a New Alternative to Arbitration, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 697 (1997).
110. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2002).
111. See id.; Volt, 489 U.S. at 469.
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from a formal adjudicative process and,' 12 therefore, further limiting judicial re-
view of arbitration awards should be endorsed by the courts.
It is well settled that parties are able to control the terms of arbitration by
specifying their desires in the language of the agreement to arbitrate."13 In several
instances, courts have upheld contractual agreements that expanded the scope of
judicial review of arbitration awards.' 14 However, expanded judicial review in
fact contradicts the purposes of arbitration by lengthening the time to a final reso-
lution, increasing costs, and increasing the level of judicial involvement in the
process. 1 5 Also, expanded judicial review may harm the legitimacy and integrity
of arbitration and "undermine[] the status and professionalism of arbitrators.""11 6
Even so, the courts are still reluctant to alter the mutually agreed upon terms that
the parties included in their agreement to arbitrate." 7 It seems clear that as long
as the arbitration terms, as agreed to by the parties, are not unconscionable, the
courts will enforce those terms and allow the parties to decide the procedure of the
arbitration process for their disputes even when the terms of the agreement un-
dermine some advantages of arbitration." 8
Private agreements to further limit judicial review beyond the limitations pro-
vided by the FAA should be upheld by the courts. Limiting, as opposed to ex-
panding, appellate review furthers the interests of arbitration in bringing finality to
disputes." Limited review also allows the arbitration parties to minimize the
time and expense that they will have to expend in reaching a conclusion to their
disputes. However, all judicial review should not be eliminated, even by contract
and an absolute limitation would likely not be enforced. 120 The courts have made
112. See Kenneth M. Curtin, Contractual Expansion & Limitation of Judicial Review of Arbitral
Awards, 56-APR DISP. RESOL. J. 74, 77-78 (2001); supra note 108.
113. Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001); see supra notes 7 &
105-07.
114. Kayser, 257 F.3d at 293 (3d Cir. held that parties may opt out of FAA vacatur standards); Syncor
Int'l Corp. v. McLeland, 120 F.3d 262 (No. 96-2261) (4th Cir. 1997) (4th Cir. allowed parties to ex-
pand judicial review); Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th
Cir. 1995) (5th Cir. allowed contractual expansion of judicial review); see supra note 74; Lee Gold-
man, Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 171 (2003);
Mosebey, supra note 7; Margaret Moses, Can Parties Tell Courts What To DO? Expanded Judicial
Review ofArbitral Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. REv. 429 (2004).
115. Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 2003); Draho-
zal, supra note 7, at 427 ("[E]xpanded review may delay a final outcome and increase the costs of the
proceeding."); Ilya Enkishev, Above the Law: Practical and Philosophical Implications of Contract-
ing for Expanded Judicial Review, 3 J. AM. ARB. 61, 63 (2004).
116. Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2001); lya Enkishev, supra note
115, at 63, 94; Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitral
Awards, 8 Am. REv. INT'L ARB. 147, 151-52 (1997); Kevin A. Sullivan, The Problems of Permitting
Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 46 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 509, 552-53 (2002).
117. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477-79
(1989). "[The FAA's principal purpose is to ensure that private arbitration agreements are enforced
according to their terms." Id. at 469.
118. See generally supra notes 114 & 115.
119. See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 931; Kenneth M. Curtin, Contractual Expansion & Limitation of Judi-
cial Review of Arbitral Awards, 56-APR Disp. RESOL. J. 74, 77-78 (2001). See generally Drahozal,
supra note 7, at 427.
120. See Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2003).
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it clear that for an arbitration award to be enforced by the courts, the district court
must still be able to review the award for "manifest disregard" for the law.'
21
While agreements limiting appellate review of arbitration awards have been
endorsed by the courts, the courts will only do so when the agreement clearly and
unequivocally indicates the parties express intention to limit review. 122 In Mac-
tec,' 3 the court did allow the contract provision limiting review because the con-
tract language specifically stated that a judgment entered on the arbitrator's award
"shall be final and nonappealable."' 12 4 On the other hand, in Bowen v. Amoco
Pipeline Co., 12 the court held that an agreement indicating that the arbitration
award "shall be final" did not limit judicial review because the ambiguous phrase
did not clearly express the parties' intentions to limit review.' 26 Although a court
should be willing to enforce an agreement limiting review, it is also fair to the
arbitration parties for the courts to do so only in cases where the contract language
clearly and unequivocally expresses the parties' intentions to limit appellate re-
view of an arbitration award.
Some arguments are asserted in opposition to reducing judicial review of ar-
bitration awards. One argument raised as to why judicial review should not be
reduced is that it will allow erroneous awards that are endorsed by the district
court to escape review and therefore be enforced. 27 There is always the possibil-
ity of an anomalous case in which the arbitrator hands down a clearly erroneous
decision. 18 In these cases, however, the district courts will still have jurisdiction
to reverse such a decision, because while appellate review should be able to be
eliminated by contract, a district court level review would remain.' 29 Further, the
FAA itself provides for vacatur only in cases where the arbitration award is
"clearly erroneous. ' 30 Under the FAA, it is possible for erroneous awards that
don't reach the level of "clearly erroneous" to be enforced by the courts and a
limitation on appellate review will not create results inconsistent with the FAA.
A second argument against limiting judicial review of arbitration agreements
is the potential for great disparity in the bargaining power between the parties who
have agreed to settle their disputes with arbitration and are essentially "forced" to
limit review. It is true that, in many instances, the parties who have agreed to
121. Id.; see also 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).
122. See MACTEC, Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821, 830 (10th Cir. 2005); Bowen, 254 F.3d at 931.
123. MACTEC, 427 F.3d at 829.
124. Id. at 827, 829-30.
125. Bowen, 254 F.3d at 931.
126. Id. at 930. The court did, however, note that an arbitration agreement may limit judicial review
of an arbitration award if the parties clearly and unequivocally express their intentions to do so. Id. at
931.
127. See Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2003).
128. See Drahozal, supra note 7, at 427. (An erroneous award by the arbitrator would be "aberra-
tional."); Erickson & Bowen, supra note 3, at 44. (Parties are generally more satisfied with an arbitra-
tor's decision.); Christi L. Underwood, Construction Arbitration: The Arbitration Process and Prac-
tice Tips for Advocates, 80-Mar. FLA. B.J. 16, 17 (2006) (Arbitrators take their job seriously and use
common sense in evaluating cases.); see also Enkishev, supra note 115, at 94-95 (Arbitrator's are
specifically chosen by the parties and awards are more predictable than judicial awards.)
129. See supra notes 120 &121.
130. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2002); Bowen, 254 F.3d at 931.
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arbitration do have differing levels of bargaining power.' 3 1 However, the federal
courts have held that a contract provision limiting judicial review must be "clear
and unequivocal" and the parties both must have expressly intended to limit judi-
cial review.132 If these strict notification requirements are adhered to, there will be
no surprise to the weaker party and they will be able to fully appreciate the conse-
quences of such a provision.' 33 In a case where a party truly does not wish to limit
review and nevertheless must consent to such a provision in order to finalize an
agreement with the other party, such a limitation of review will not necessarily
prejudice that party.' 34 The party will still be allowed to present their case, sup-
porting their position in the dispute, to a neutral arbitrator who will assess all the
evidence and hand down a decision to the best of their ability. The party claiming
a disadvantage is also free to raise the defense that the contract was unconscion-
able and a contract of adhesion.' 35 For the most part, arbitrators are extremely fair
and competent and a party with less influence will typically receive "justice" even
if the arbitration agreement limits appellate review of the arbitration award.
3 6
While arguments against limiting appellate review seem compelling, they miss the
big picture and fail to recognize the overall interests in arbitration of reducing
costs, time to resolution, and judicial interference in the process, which are all
furthered with limited judicial review.
VI. CONCLUSION
Arbitration is a unique alternative dispute resolution process whereby disput-
ing parties engage in a process in which a neutral third party will determine the
rights of the parties in a semi-judicial process. This process is aimed at providing
satisfactory conclusions to disputes in a process that is quicker and cheaper than
pursuing the dispute through a formal judicial proceeding. The FAA establishes
extensive guidelines for arbitration; however, those guidelines can be altered by
clear language in the contract that mandates arbitration as the process whereby
disputes will be settled. Under the FAA, review of arbitration awards is very nar-
row in an attempt to further the goals of a dispute resolution process intended to
be more efficient than the courts. Many courts have allowed arbitration parties to
131. See Richard DeWitt & Rick DeWitt, No Pay No Play: How To Solve the Nonpaying Party
Problem in Arbitration, 60-Apr. DIsp. RESOL. J. 27, 31 (2005) (discussing arbitration agreements
between parties with differing levels of bargaining power).
132. Supra note 126.
133. Scott J. Burnham, The War Against Arbitration in Montana, 66 MONT. L. REV. 139,199 (2005)
(noting that arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion must be reasonably expected by the parties);
see Celeste M. Hammond, The (Pre) (As) sumed "Consent" of Commercial Binding Arbitration Con-
tracts: An Empirical Study of Attitudes and Expectations of Transactional Lawyers, 36 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 589, 650 (2003) (stating that full notice is necessary when large disparities in bargaining
power are present).
134. See Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Services, 105 F.3d 1465, 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (The Supreme Court
has held that review under the "manifest disregard" standard is sufficient to ensure statutory compli-
ance in such cases.).
135. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Bob Schultz Motors,
Inc. v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 334 F.3d 721, 723-24 (8th Cir. 2003) (The 8th Circuit affirmed
the arbitrator's award and determination that agreement was a contract of adhesion and arbitration
provision was unconscionable.). Id. at 727.
136. Supra note 133.
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expand judicial review of arbitration awards and some courts have also allowed
parties to reduce judicial review to a level less than the default standards set out in
the FAA. Therefore, it is clear that contracting parties who clearly manifest their
intent to further limit judicial review of an arbitration agreement so as to expedite
the dispute resolution process and reduce costs should be allowed to do so because
their intentions are consistent with the goals of arbitration and federal courts have
shown a willingness to recognize such limitations when they are clearly expressed
in the parties' agreement to arbitrate.
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